Group conflict and class formation in South-East Asia more

GROUP CONFLICT AND CLASS FORMATION 109 7. Group Conflict a~~ Class Formation in South-East ASia HANS-DIETER EVERS ONE . ced b South-East Asian statesmen and of the most difficult tasks fa dY d edict the major trends of . . understan an pr 'd scholars alIke IS to assess, . h The task would be forml ., I d lopments 111 e area. t social and pohtIca eve I S uth-East Asia it appears to . . rea as comp ex as 0 . able in any society, 111n a a b .' Should we then contlUue be doomed to failure right from ~e .~g~n~ni~vestigating isolated village to study the 'golden ro.ad to mo a~: o~hers have done, should we study communities, as MannI11~Nash II t ns like 'Modjokuto', and genethe social history of particular sma o~., the fate of nations through ralize from there (Geertz), or even eXPAa~n'personality' (pye, Philipps, . d' f th South-East SIan . micrOSCOPictu les 0 s e r 't d need for further detaIled an d Piker)? I feel there is still an al~ost ~~Iml ~ the work cited above. Neverlocalized studies of the same high ca Idr~h major trends of modernization a theless we cannot expect to under~~n T e generalize from specific cases is in South-East Asia from these stu les. 0 . conflicts and changes are methodologicallY dubious. Fur~her7~~e~i~:;0:nd processes. If we set out based on societal if n~t i~ternatlon~ .nc I do not see why we should not to study the modernIzation o~~o~etI~ focuS on societies and their strucconcentrate directly on one su ~e.c.an . d' .duals . ture rather than on villages, famIhes or 111IVI U· 'ty on a . . on sabbatical leave from Yale mverSI 1958 IThis paper was wrItten while I was. resented here were developed .from senior faculty fello":,,shi l~ost o~~:e ~~:~t~ on industrial entr~prene~rs ~na;:y~~~: to the present d~rIng e re~ Thailand higher civil servants I~ ThaI dan ps has Buddhist monks In Ceylon an .' 's selection of countrIes an. grou st fessionals in Indonesia and l1a1aysla. Thi of roup and class formation m South-Ell at 1· ~~~l~~~~:~~~c:o~~~;:I~:a!}i~~r~~~~fa~:r~~~~ ~~~:~o:ew~:~u~e~~~~ the Institute of Southeast AsI~t SJ from a lively discussion after readmg part rs that the major errors. I als? be~e .e •.•. 1971 I am to be blamed for those erro paper at Columbia UmversIty In !Y.ay . remain. Attempts to work in this direction are rare. Coedes' classical studies on the 'Indianization' of South-East Asia were not followed by similar works on 'Islamization', 'Westernization' or 'Modernization'. Boeke's theory of the development of a capitalist colonial economy and its dual structure and Benda's essay on 'the structure of South-East Asian history' stand out among the very few attempts to discover basic and long term trends in modern South-East Asia. Short of writing a monumental work on the modem history of South-East Asia, what methods could we use and what theories employ t6 detect, analyse and describe some of the major social and political trends in modernizing South-East Asia? There appear to be two major options. The first is to utilize recent theories of modernization developed by American social scientists. I find most of them of little value. Lerner's communications theory, Marion Levy's and David Apter's rather abstract systems theories, Inkeles' modernization scales, and Talcott Parsons' neo-evolutionary paradigms appear to be too far removed from an empirical reality beset by societywide conflicts, widespread political unrest, war, insurgency, starvation, massacres and racial strife. The second option, it appears to me, entails going back to theories developed along with empirical studies on the same topic in other societies and historical periods. Here the concern of social scientists with the modernization of European societies, the demise of its feudal past and the development of capitalist or socialist societies and political systems comes to mind. Weber's monumental work on rationalization, conflict and competition, the development of bureaucracies and the establishment of legal systems of domination appear to be as relevant today in South-East Asia as at the turn of the century in Europe. Durkheim's theories on the division of labour in society, Pareto's circulation of elites and Schumpeter's and Sombart's work on the rise of capitalism provide, together with the Marx, Engels and Lenin theories of conflict and development, a formidable arsenal to attack the problems of modem South-East Asian development. Especially the theories of class and class conflict as societal (rather than partial) theories discussed by almost all the above-mentioned authors and developed by their followers give us the necessary tools already applied successfully elsewhere. The question then, of course, is: do we have class structures in South-East Asian societies or better, are classes sufficiently developed to warrant an analysis of major social and political processes in terms of class theory? In short, does a class theory fit the empirical reality of South-East Asian societies? There is no question about the existence of marked social inequality and conflict in South-East Asia. But is this social inequality structured into social classes and does conflict arise out of contradictions between classes? It is my thesis that South-East Asian societies have already developed or are in the process of developing a rather specific type of class structure and that this class structure and its inherent conflicts provide the frame- lDuuence II nOl aelermme IUlure SOCIal, pOlltlCal ana economIC aevelopments in the area. I have thus chosen the framework of a theory of class formation and class conflict not to prove or disprove the theory itself, but to analyse what I think is a major trend in the 'modernization' of South-East Asian societies. Before I set out to explain my thesis let me anticipate some of the basic and major criticisms that have been levelled against attempts to discuss some South-East Asian societies in the framework of social class. The criticism runs approximately like this: a class structure is a typical European type of social organization born under very specific historical circumstances. To use a class model to analyse South-East Asian societies means forcing an alien way of thinking on a completely different cultural tradition and on a very differently organized social system. We would thus create an artificial society that only exi"sts in the minds of foreign social scientists but bears no resemblance to social reality nor the thinking of its own members. Students of South-East Asian societies have, as far as they have commented on larger societal structures at all, tended to stress vertical links or patronage systems, superimposed on a more or less loosely structured peasant society. One recent study on Burma points out that 'below the national elite the social order is fairly undifferentiated and there is hardly a stratification approaching that of a class structure. People are not class conscious' (Lissak, 1970:72). For Indonesia vertical structures, in Indonesian called aliran (stream), have been described as the main structural principle of Indonesian society. A common religious or cultural value system rather than class consciousness is said to integrate different socio-economic group in each 'stream'. Class divisions are therefore nonexistent, irrelevant or indistinguishable.l For the case of Thailand Lucien Hanks has claimed that efforts to depict social classes in Thai society flounder because of misconstruing the nature of this social order which resembles a military organization more than an occidental class type society. Like an army, Thai society has a hierarchy of fixed ranks which determine occupation, but one moves freely from occupation to occupation up and down the hierarchy (Hanks, 1962: 1252). Though an army never struck me as a particularly flexible type of organization with a high degree of mobility from lower ranks into the officers corps, the implications of Hanks are clear: differences between integrated units and minutely differentiated ranks are important but not horizontally differentiated groups or classes. Similar arguments are also very frequent among leaders of South-East Asian societies themselves. In recent interviews with local political party ISee Wertheim, 1959, Geertz, 1965, and Hindley, 1970, for recent discussions on this theme. Gunawan and van der Muijzenberg, 1967, described similar structures in the Netherlands. class was abolished during the revolution. Views like this confirm Peter Worsley's description of what he calls 'populism' in Third World countries: The societies of Asia and Africa are commonly seen by theorists in those countries not so much in terms of the class divisions that the Westerner almost instinctively begins to look for, but in terms of the common life-situation of whole populations which derives from their past and present tradition of village level democracy, and from the unifying experience of common political expression and economic impoverishment at the hands of foreign imperialists (Worsley, 1964: 130). Though it is quite possible that Western social scientists have been influenced by the teachings of 'populist' political leaders or by discussions with intellectuals holding similar views, I do not necessarily want to allege that their statements confuse ideology with social reality (as in Evers, 1966). 1Their observations that clearly distinguished classes did not exist in the respective South-East Asian countries at the time of their visit may very well be true. It would then perhaps be a misconstruction to describe the respective societies at that very moment in class terms. But it would certainly not be a valid assumption that a study of a society at anyone particular point in time would give a fair description of the 'nature' (if, indeed, there is such a thing) of that society. A major characteristic of all South-East Asian societies is, after all, that they are changing and that this change is fairly rapid. My point, then, is that the often described fluidity or loose structure,2 as well as the compartmentalization into vertical organizations, dual or multiple, into alirans, cliques and patronage systems are all aspects of rapid change and at times of the reorganization into an emerging class system. But this is an empirical question and I will have to put forward my thesis in the conteX!t of major social trends in some South-East Asian societies, after I have outlined the theoretical framework of my analysis. IProfessor Alatas objected to this statement during the seminar discussion. He felt I should not have retracted from my 1966 statement, made in relation to Thailand, but should have expanded it to include also Indonesia and other South-East Asian societies. South-East Asians themselves,Professor Alatas suggested,never had any doubts about the existence of a class structure, only foreign scholars blurred the issue. I would not quarrel with this point of view, except that I recognize the particular difficulties of anthropologists in analysing class structures within their normal theoretical instrumentarium. I would also admit that at certain times structural features other than classes are more relevant towards an understanding of a society at that time. 2Acritical evaluation of the loose structure concept is the subject of a recent book and need not be repeated here: H. D. Evers, ed., Loosely Structured Social Systems, Thailand in Comparative Perspective, New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asian Studies, 1969. GROUP CONFLICT AND CLASS FORMATION 113 II The formation of classes is a slow historical process. Classes do not emerge over-night though dramatic events like wars or revolutions may speed up the process considerably. Even so, the positions making up a class have to be created and multiplied first. We might look at a simple model to clarify this point. Say we find a clearly developed class structure in a certain society at a certain time. There is an aristocratic upper class consisting of feudal and clerical nobles, monopolizing military power and control over land ~nd dominating a fairly homogeneous peasantry. If we study the same society a few hundred years later, we may again find a strict class structure, but made up of completely different groups. Aristocrats and serfs have more or less disappeared. The upper class is made up of 'bourgeois capitalists', dominating an industrial proletariat. We are now faced by a question a Chinese historian might like to ask when he compares one firmly established dynasty with the next: what precisely happened in between two firmly patterned social and political structures? How did the transition take place? If in our case 'bourgeois capitalists' form the new upper class, when did the first person of this species make his dramatic appearance? And who was the first 'proletarian' ? Putting all this into less fictitious terms: any firmly established social order contains already the seeds of a new social structure in the form of individuals or groups who might under certain conditions at certain times grow and develop into larger units, groups or classes. Class formation can thus be traced back to the individualleveI. Before a new class emerges there have to be new social positions sharing the same 'life chances', the same relation to the means of production and power and the same values. Here the connexion to- what is now commonly called 'modernization' becomes apparent. The formation of new positions is, indeed, 'modernization'. This process is usually described by evolutionary theorists as social differentiation (or by classical thinkers as an increasing division of labour!. Though no detailed studies on social differentiation in South-E~st ~sla are available we can conclude from some statistical data and histOrIcal accounts that the process was fairly slow, until very recently, both in terms of new roles and in terms of persons filling the new positions. This is indirectly supported by the fact that the proportion of the non-agricult~ral section of the population of South-East Asian societies (with the exceptIOn of Singapore and West Malaysia) has not significantly risen, but has remained roughly at a 20 per cent level in contrast to earlier European developments. In many cases the appearance of new roles has been quite sudden and those who take up these new positions had to go through a rigorous resocialization process.1 Large-scale organizations like bureaucracies, the colonial school system and armed forces usually provided forceful resocialization agencies and were as such indispensable for modernization and the creation of modern positions. In other words, the European experience of the gradual differentiation of social positions out of pre-modem society is not repeated in South-East Asia, but differentiation occurs primarily by importing role patterns or by their imposition on society from abroad, usually through the establishment of large-scale organizations. Modernization, social evolution and social differentiation are therefore largely foreign impositions on South-East Asian countries. Bureaucracies are patterned on Euro-American examples and differences are treated as deviations to be abolished, the medical profession subscribes to the ethics and standards of their counterparts in industrialized countries and factories hardly make any allowance for the different social background of their workers and try to achieve the same organizational standards as American factories. Modernization in the sense of role differentiation is therefore largely guided from outside and superimposed on a small section of the non-agrarian population. As the number of positions for each occupational role increases, social mobility has to be high initially.2 In fact during the first generation a new IThe psychological pressure and personal conflict accompanying the creation of new positions can be expressed in religious terms. There is generally in South-East Asia an increased interest in religion, exorcism and magic. Persons who have migrated to the cities to fill the new roles in the middle ranges of governmental and private bureaucracies seem to have lost their village or kinship connexions without having as yet developed an urban or occupational identity. To express their personal conflicts they turn to traditional means, black magic, and to relieve their anxiety they take part in exorcist rites or mystical practices. Spirit medium cults in Singapore, vows to town spirits (at lak muang temples) in Thailand, exorcism in Colombo, kebatinan groups in Java, and keramat veneration in Malaysian and Indonesian towns seem to attract more followers than ever before. As far as some preliminary studies show the new clients are predominantly second generation urban dwellers and occupants of a multitude of new middle level clerical and technical positions. . Some recent still unpublished studies are Gananath Obeyesekere's studies on exorcism 10 urban Ceylon, and the present writer's studies together with Arthur Stillman, Daniel Regan and Arman Moechtar, on a spirit temple in Bangkok and on traditional medical practitioners in Malaya and Sumatra. For Java, see Mulder, 1970. 2~. K8;mol Somvichian and Mokhzani remarked in their comments on this paper, mobIlIty 10 the colonial period took partly the form of transferring an old strategic grOUp or class, usually indigenous aristocracies, into new positions. This mobility can also be described as the modernization of a traditional elite. Modernization of the Thai bureaucracy started initially this way, higher training facilities in Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies were restricted to members of the nobility, and mandarins continued to take over government positions in French Indo-China. The expansion of ~owe~ level colonial bureaucracies and new professional positions, especially in conJunctIOn with an expanding capitalist estate economy, increased, however, mobility from other groups. From the few available studies on this topic we can guess that social mobility into new positions tended to be high in most South-East Asian countries around the turn of the century, but declined before and during the economic depression of the late 19308. See e.g. Furnivall (1939: 443) on Indonesia; Evers, 1966, on Thailand, and Evers, 1964 on Ceylon. 114 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION GROUP CONFLICT AND CLASS FORMATION 115 position is in existence there is 100 per cent in-flow into the new positions. Mobility for the whole society might not be high, but mobility in the newly emerging sector of the occupational structure has to show a very high rate. In the initial phases of modernization persons in modern positions tend therefore to be highly mobile people with all the characteristics associated with strong mobility.l In the beginning the incumbents of new positions had probably very little in common. They might at best be seen as what Dahrendorf has termed 'quasi groups' (Dahrendorf, 1962). A sense of common identity is originally still overridden by an identity with the immediate social sur· roundings, the ethnic group, the kin group, or the stratum of origin.2 An awareness of the fact that members of a quasi group are affected in a similar way by the economic, social and political forces in a country is often created by dramatic events. The reduction in the number of civil servants in Thailand in 1924-7 or the reduction in business opportunities of Indonesian traders after a heavy influx of Chinese immigrants in the 1920s has developed a common identity and some form of internal organization (e.g. the foundation of Sarekat Islam). Quasi groups are thus transformed into what I would like to call 'strategic groups', as they now become of strategic importance as groups for political development, for conflict situations, reform or revolution in their societies. They actively promote their own economic or political goals. They tend to support the activities of leaders, emerging out of their own ranks, or those leaders who are thought to represent their aspirations. The strategic group is thus a recruiting field for political leadership and a political pressure group at the same time. I shall later return to an analysis of strategic group formation in South-East Asia, but might mention here that civil servants, the military, teachers, professionals and Chinese businessmen seem to have been the major strategic groups in modern South-East Asia. An important condition for strategic group formation seems to be a sudden increase in the membership of a quasi group. An increase in size (not the absolute size as such) will put pressure on members to seek an appropriate share of wealth and power available in a society. (A sudden reduction in the available wealth might have a similar impact.) This will eventually always result in a conflict situation with other groups who either 11 have tried to analyse the relations between inter-generational mobility and the attitudes towards changes and cultural traditions in a research report entitled 'Highe~ Civil Servants in Thailand: Overseas Education, Mobility and Attitudes towards their own Cultural Tradition', Freiburg, Germany: Arnold Bergstraesser Institute, 1964. 2Striking examples emerged during a recent (1970) survey in a provincial town in Indonesia. There was a clear difference between an older generation of lawyers, who were very much involved in the welfare of their immediate community, in business transactions and religious affairs, but took little interest in the endeavours of the new generation of lawyers and their professional organization. Questions after common problems of professionals usually drew a blank with the older lawyers. are on their way to increasing their share of scarce resources or are defending their old position. The perception of potential conflict is certainly increased if members of strategic groups have what James Scott (1968) has called a 'constant pie orientation'. The endeavour of group members is in this case primarily directed at staking a claim to what is essentially perceived as a constant amount of goods, services, and positions. Enlarging the pie and appropriating the a.dditions is not seen as a viable alternative. If indeed this constant pie orientation is as widespread as Scott claims, than it might help to explain the lack of social differentiation and the intensification of group conflict. The ensuing conflict between groups may then, however, bring about awareness of a common interest, group cohesion and solidarity through the mechanism analysed in detail by Simmel and later by Lewis Coser in his book on the functions of conflict. This new or increased solidarity of the strategic group will be expressed in a distinct style of life and in the foundation of voluntary organizations. This in turn indicates that not only the person following a modern occupation himself, but his whole family becomes increasingly tied to the fate of his strategic group. Marriage within the strategic group and increasing self-recruitment reduce mobility into the group and strengthen group cohesion. The political framework of group conflict is largely determined by the sequence in which strategic groups evolve. In a modernizing society whose old social and political order is doomed to disappear, new norms for political action have to be established. The first modern strategic group to emerge will have the most decisive influence on the new political culture. Once the rules of the game have been established and a distinct political style adopted, any future changes have to take account of the past structure. In most cases it will require a 'cultural revolution' to change the established political normative system. A recent book by Barrington Moore provides a good deal of material to back this view though its major theme is somewhat different. Moore concentrated his attention on several strategic groups, the landed gentry, the peasantry, the government administration, and the urban bourgeoisie. The rise of any of these to power in a revolution set the stage for the major different political systems in the modern world. His studies of Britain, France, Germany, the U.S., China, Japan, and India, lead him to discern three major routes to the modern world: a revolution from above by a combined gentry and bureaucracy led to fascism, a bourgeois revolution of the urban bourgeoisie to western style democracy, and a peasant revolution to communism. It is not so much the descriptive historical contents of Moore's work but the theoretical aspects, that are of interest here. The development of strategic groups, their struggle for dominance, and the identification of their interests and norms with what is to be tlte modernization process provides an excellent framework for analysing South-East Asian developments. 116 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION GROUP CONFLICT AND CLASS FORMATION 117 The process of group formation might very well be arrested and create a situation of confusion and long term conflict. An example is provided by Clifford Geertz. In his study on the social history of a Javanese town he describes the formation of strategic groups out of basic occupational groups. He then goes on to analyse how these what he calls 'first-order sociocultural groupings' are transformed, divided, rearranged in a time of revolution, political instability and economic depression into the already mentioned aliran. Strategic group formation meant modernization, the establishment of the aliran system a relapse into traditional patterns, without actually reestablishing an integrated traditional society. 'Both tradition and modernity seemed to be receding at an increasing rate, leaving only the relics of the first and the simulacrum of the second. With every shake of the kaleidoscope the past seemed further back and the future further ahead' (Geertz,1965: 152). This period of confusion, transformation and change, through which a number of South-East Asian countries have gone or are going, is precisely the period I have alluded to in the beginning. It would be misleading to interpret the nature or essence of any society on the basis of a flashlight photo in the darkness of turmoil and rapid change. If we adopt a longterm perspective there are signs that a new social structure will emerge. This new structure, I feel, will come about through a transformation of strategic groups into social classes, and I shall therefore try to present some theoretical propositions on this process of class formation in developing societies. III A rigid class structure and intensive class conflict are not very common phenomena. Basic patterns of structural conflict in a society can probably best be analysed as group conflicts between established and emerging strategic groups. Even if we can discern a fairly clearly developed class structure, there will nevertheless be remnants of strategic groups or newly emerging ones, both providing internal structure to classes. In many cases strategic groups will dominate the social and political scene for prolonged periods of time until under certain conditions a class structure develops. In any case the dissolution of one class structure or a revolutionary change will always be preceded by the development of strategic groups, which will confuse the strict class pattern until a new class system emerges (if at all). The question then is how are strategic groups transformed into classes? A class structure always presupposes a division into a ruling class and classes of those being ruled. It is of course perfectly possible that a society is dominated by a number of conflicting strategic groups. There seems to be, however, a tendency towards coalition. In fact coalitions and mergers of strategic groups controlling different shares of the societal wealth and power appear to be basic to class formation. Historical examples abound from the somewhat uneasy alliance between feudal nobility and clergy during European middle ages to the merger of civil service, big business and military elites analysed by C. Wright Mills for the U.S. The shift of the allegiance of the intellectuals from a ruling class to a subject class (e.g. an intellectuals - working class alliance) has been described as an important factor in the creation of a revolutionary situation by Crane Brinton. Pooling of resources to maintain the ruling position, exchange of personnel and common membership in organizations are some of the mechanism of coalition. A further aspect of class formation is the restriction or control of mobility into the new class. This is especially felt after a period of high mobility during the formation of strategic groups. Conflict between classes is inherent in any society structured by class, as well as group conflict is inherent in a society structured by strategic groups. There are, however, various ways to reduce, channel or gloss over class conflict (Dahrendorf, 1959). One way is. to transform class conflict into inter-personal competition by allowing social mobility and propagating an ideology of equal opportunity for all. This way is usually not open to South-East Asian societies, because opportunity for mobility is so obviously low and because intense inter-personal conflict is less likely in a society in which ethnic and family loyalties still loom large. An Asian solution is, however, provided in the form of clique and patronage systems. Disbursement of government funds and positions and sometimes sharing of dividends from corruption tend to keep patronage systems going for longer periods of time, though closing of downward patronage channels through closer integration of the upper class, economic crises or the creation of competitive patronage systems can endanger the precarious balance.! The main threat to such class systems is those new strategic groups that are difficult to integrate into patronage systems, like students or peasant movements. I shall now turn to a similar loose discussion of some trends in group and class formation in South-East Asia. IV There is little doubt that class systems existed in South-East Asia before and during the colonial period. The colonial bureaucracies with their higher ranks formed together with the military officers, estate and big business managers or owners a caste-like upper class in firm control of the GROUP CONFLICT AND CLASS FORMATION 119 TABLE 12 RURAL AND URBAN POPULATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIA Country Relative decrease of Per cent urban rural population population 1950-1970 1970 (percentage i points) Per cent of agricultural population 19701 Brunei Burma Indonesia Khmer Republic Laos Malaysia W. Malaysia Sabah Sarawak I 44.1 15.8 17.9 I -1.1 -2.9 -5.6 -4.9 -6.9 64 70 76 78 56 12.8 13.4 I ! 45.8 16.7 19.0 23.2 10.4 100.0 -21.5 -3.5 -7.5 -3.3 -0.5 - - 70 Philippines Portuguese Timor Singapore Sri Lanka (Ceylon) Thailand Vietnam, North Vietnam, South 8 52 76 78 74 13.0 23.9 26.1 - -3.0 -16.1 -9~9 lPercentage figuresare the same for economic active population in agriculture as per cent of the economically active population. Sources: Cot I and 2 Kingsley Davis, World Urbqnization 1?5O-19~O,V:ot I. Berkeley, California (Institute of InternatIOnal StudIes, Umversltyof California), 1969. Cot 3 FAO Production Yearbook 1971, Table 4. economic resources and political affairs of the colonies.1 Also in precolonial society class lines were rigid enough. For Thailand Prince Damrong points out that 'Thai society was divided into two classes, the nai who constituted the governing class and the phrai who were governed'. Upward mobility, fl. recent study on the early Bangkok period adds, 'from the lower class ... tothat of the governing class, i.e. the nobles and princes, appears to have been extremely difficult, except in time of war and irregular succession to the throne' (Akin Rabibhadana, 1969:155). However, the establishment of modern bureaucracies and modern professions in South-East Asia from the middle of the nineteenth century onward carried in itself the seed for the destruction of the pre-colonial and colonial stratification systems. The emergence of new strategic groups provided the leadership for nationalist movements, for multi-party systems, and the ensuing fluid situation of intense group conflict mentioned before. There are some clearly discernible trends in strategic group formation and social change in South-East Asia. (1) As mentioned before there was no marked decline in the proportion of the agricultural population. Though figures are notoriously dubious there are indications that in some countries the percentage of people en gaged in agriculture and fishing has actually risen at times.2 The Indonesian agricultural population was estimated to account for 66 per cent of the total population in 1930,67 per cent in 1965 and 70 per cent in 1970. (FAO Production Yearbook 1965, 1969, 1970). In Thailand the respective figure dropped a mere 4 per cent from 82 in 1935 to 78 in 1965. For Malaysia we can register a decline by about 6 percentage points for the same period. Also in the Philippines the agricultural population was reduced only from 73 per cent in 1935 to an estimated 70 per cent in 1970. The three South-East Asian countries with the lowest proportion of their work force in peasant agriculture are Singapore, Malaysia and Ceylon. The estate and mining workers, whose numbers rose rapidly earlier during this century, could become a considerable political force in Malaysia and Ceylon if they were organized in militant unions. Though the background of the communist uprising in the so-called Malayan Emergency is more complex, the attempt of the Communists to work through trade unions was a major factor in the post-war political scene. Most estate workers were effectively kept out of politics both in Malaysia and in Ceylon as they were isolated and treated as foreigners, but Colombobased unions played and still play a major role in Ceylon politics. The 1971uprising in Ceylon came, however, not as a working class movement, but appears to be almost completely a revolt of unemployed university lFor Indonesia see Wertheim, 1959. 2In Europe the decline of the agricultural population stopped briefly during the economic depression of the 19308and in some areas (e.g. in Spain) farm labour actually increased. though for only a short period of time. 120 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION graduates, that means a strategic group of 'pre-professionals' and 'prebureaucrats'. It is interesting to note, however, that despite recent developments a system of parliamentary democracy is maintained and has functioned reasonably well in these countries characterized by a declining agricultural work force. There have, of course, been substantial changes within the agricultural population like large-scale migration from North to South in Vietnam, Burma and Thailand, the growth of an agrarian estate proletariat in Malaya, Ceylon and parts of Indonesia and the Philippines, the increase in the number of tenants and impoverished peasants through mounting pressure on scarce agricultural resources, primarily land. The fact remains, however, that the agricultural work force still forms the majority of the South-East Asian population. If this trend is reversed, if the share of nonagricultural occupations rises, the repercussions for the overall structure of South-East Asian societies will be considerable. As I have mentioned before it will then be of primary importance for future political developments, which other groups develop first, which groups will use the strength of growing numbers to impress their interests and norms on the political system of the future. (2) In the process of modernization, traditional strategic groups have steadily declined, at least until the 1950s, as their modern functional equivalents have increased in relative importance. We have thus a decrease in aristocrats and a rise of bureaucrats, a decrease in religious specialists and a rise in teachers and secular professionals. In Thailand for instance the share of Buddhist monks dropped from 21 per 1,000 of population in 1911 to 5.7 in 1965, while the share of teachers rose from 1.1 per 1,000 of population in 1925 to 5.5 in 1965(seeTable 13). In Indonesia the percentage of cabinet ministers using aristocratic titles dropped from 30 per cent in 1945-57 to 9 per cent in 1957-64 (Yasunaka, 1970:116). In general, the importance of traditional titles has been challenged by educational degrees. Though members of the' old aristocracy still play an important social and ritual role in Malaysia and Thailand, the only country where they are in formal positions of power is Laos, after the fall of Cambodia's Sihanouk. There has, however, been a reversal in this general trend in some countries. In South Vietnam the number of traditional Vietnamese medical practitioners has gone up considerablyl (from 1,217 in 1951 to 3,049 in 1962 according to the Statistical Yearbook 1964-65), in Ceylon the Ayurvedic doctors have consolidated their ranks and became a major IMr. Mokhzani suggested in his comments on this paper that this revival might actually have a 'cushioning effect of modernization of the daily life of people in Southeast Asia'. Traditional medical practioners for instance 'help to re-interpret the changing situation in terms which are understood by the common man', "'5~ S~ c.; ~ Q" l""l o ONo::t .....c.....c •.....• o 000 .;: ~ ':<u ~;:s 2 c. 0 0 S :i tiQ" <u ...:l ~~ •• ;:s _l""l 0'1 N 00 0- 00 00 i:i ~ ~ ~ <u __ __ t--l""lONooNon ,-.., ",:~,,;,,;~.n.n _NonOOO'lo::tOOO-t-- \ClN"':OOO\Clo'\Cl\Cl.n .....c •.....••.....••.....• OO'S on N '-' '-' -- 122 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION political force during the past fifteen years and in Java a process of retraditionalization seems to take place'! It is difficult to judge whether these structural underpinnings of cultural renaissance movements are the beginning of a new trend or rearguard actions before the ultimate collapse of a traditional way of life. (3) The politically most important trend has been the rise of independent professionals, civil servants and military officers. The sequence of their emergence differs greatly among South-East Asian countries. I have already alluded to the importance of sequential patterns of development. Whereas higher civil servants and military officers have pre-established organizations which form their political constituencies, the independent professionals tend to establish their own organizations in the form of political parties or movements. Or seen from a different point of view, only one modernized section of the urban population, primarily free professionals, felt the necessity to form parties and back a multi-party system and parliamentary democracy. Leaders of national movements from Rizal, a doctor, to Sukarno, an engineer, have come from this strategic group of free professionals. Independent professionals provide leadership for new political movements, as long as they are not co-opted as technocrats by bureaucratic regimes and controlled by the strait-jacket of disciplined large-scale organizations. As there is no large industrial proletariat as yet nor an established or sizeable middle class to act as a power base, their endeavours have often been doomed to failure as they were caught between the dilemma of using traditional appeals to draw peasant support (Indonesia, Ceylon) or to radicalize peasants for revolutionary movements (Vietnam). The development of free professionals as a strategic group was relatively slow and was in some countries preceeded by a substantial growth of a government bureaucracy. The Philippines, Ceylon and Malaysia/Singapore are examples of countries where a large group of free professionals emerged fairly early. If we use the number of doctors as an index of professional development, these countries score very high before World War II: The Philippines had 29.8 per 100,000 population in 1960, Ceylon 15.9 in 1938 and Malaya (including Singapore) 14.0 in 1939.2 French Indochina, the Netherlands Indies and Thailand had only about 1.7 doctors per 100,000 population before World War II (see Table 14). lBoth Prof. Sartono and Prof. Soejito of Gajah Mada University in Jogjakarta have expressed this view. See also J. A. N. Mulder, 'Perspektip terhadap modernisasi', Basis xx, 2 (1970): 34-40, who writes 'Proses masjarakat Djawa sekarang tjenderung ke re-tradisionalisasi' (p. 29). 8There were, however, only 99 advocates and solicitors registered in Malaya and Singapore in 1940. Most legal practitioners then were not registered. (Unpublished sources, National Archives, Kuala Lumpur.) PHYSICIANS SELECTED PER TABLE 14 100,000 POPULATION IN SOUTH-EAST ASIAN COUNTRIES 1903 Burma Cambodia Ceylon Indonesia Laos West Malaysia Singapore Philippines Thailand Vietnam (S) Vietnam (N) (French Indochina) 3.5 0.71 1930-40 9.3 1950-52 11.9 1960 9.1 1966-70 10.4 4.5 15.5 1.72 16.9 1.52 22.2 2.12 27.0 3.6 6.0 14.0 11.8 15.6 25.9 65.8 10.2 11.9 8.2 29.8 1.3 (18.0)2 8.3 4.2 (18.6)2 12.0 3.4 1.7 1. Java and Madura only 2. Government serviceonly Sources: G. Myrdal, Asian Drama, Vol. III1968, Tables 30.1 and 30.2; Statistical Yearbooks of S. Vietnam, Indonesia, Thailand; U. N. Statistical Yearbook 1971. 124 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION Though I do not want to imply that there is a direct causal effect between the early development of professional occupations and the functioning of parliamentary democracy, I would, however, suggest that the emergence of free professionals was one of the necessary preconditions. This argument is further strengthened by a perusal of literature on the social background of parliamentarians. Professionals have constantly provided a high percentage of party leaders and other functionaries in democracies. Further evidence is provided by comparative data on earlier developments of stratification systems in Western countries. In the middle of the nineteenth century the U.S. and England had a much higher proportion of professionals and a much lower proportion of government officials and military officers in their work force than for example Prussia and the German Reich. The growth of the government bureaucracy preceded that of the independent professions in Germany and thus contributed to an of an authoritarian political system. Incidentally, the establishment strategic group pattern in the U.S. today is in some aspects approaching the Prussian pattern of 1870.1 In South-East Asia these countries with an early development of a strong strategic group of professionals, namely, Ceylon, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines, were also able to establish and maintain a democratic system of government for a considerable length of time. In the other South-East Asian countries professional groups were preceded or overtaken by fast growing government bureaucracies and military forces. Thailand belongs to this category. Modeniization started in Thailand in the 1880s with reorganization of the traditional civil service and a sudden increase in the number of government employees. Social mobility must have been considerable as lower rank civil servants had to be recruited from rural areas (Evers, 1966, 1967). The higher ranks were filled primarily by members of the royal house and some powerful aristocratic families. Though great efforts went into the establishment of a modern educational system the development of professions was minimal. A medical school, opened in 1899, produced only 48 graduates between 1928 and 1931. There was no independent group of lawyers, architects or engineers, to speak of. The few Thai available were all absorbed by the civil service or the military. The rapid expansion of the civil service came to a rather sudden halt about 1922 due to financial difficulties. The absolute number of government employees was reduced and the share of civil servants per 1,000 population dropped from 8.5 in 1922 to 5.8 in 1932 (see Figure I). IThe sequential pattern of strategic group development is discussed and documented in the author's unpublished paper on 'Comparative Study of Social Stratification' read as a public lecture at Duke University in November 1969. FIGURE GROWTH 1 1918-1965 per 1,000 of OF THE THAI CIVIL SERVICE, GovernmentEmployees in 1,000 250 population 9 xxxx R absolute figures, Government Employees Government employees per 1,000 population. Revolution of 1932, abolishing the absolute monarchy. D!ssatisfa~ti~n with reduced salaries, reduced chances of promotion and WIt~ .the hmit placed on upward mobility into the higher civil service POSItIO~S,monopolized by the aristocracy, led to the 1932 revolution. This revolutIOn was not a popular uprising, but a revolution of civil servants ~nd military officers against a ruling aristocracy. The fruits of the revolution became apparent shortly thereafter. The rate of government officials per 1,0~O population rose steeply from 5.5 in 1933 back to 8.5 in 1959. A senes of bloodless coups since 1932 did little to damage the basic ~tructure of the Thai stratification system. Of much greater importance ;s, I w~uld suggest, the rise of the strategic group of professionals. It is nterestIn~ t~ not~ that attempts to establish a workable political party system COInCIdeWIth the rise of professionals in the early 1950s and during the past few years.1 The recent fall of Sihanouk and the royal Cambodian family in 1970 bears some resemblance to the Thai revolution of 1932. The coalition of i an~n;ve!C?pmentsn Thailand are more fullydiscussedin a paper on 'Social Stratification The ohtlcal Develo~ment i~ Th~ila~d'" read at Cornell University in October 1969. .emergence and professlOnahzatlOn of professions is now documented by the r~~)ng of several '~ofessional Control Acts' (for architects in 1963, for engineers in .' Th~re are. estimated to be about 5,000 practising engineers and about 3,000 architects In Thailand (The Investor, Bangkok, Vol. 2, Nov. 1970: 1165). 126 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION civil servants and military officers, backed by the country's few dissatisfied intellectuals, deposed the prince somewhat reluctantly. If not for the Vietnamese war, Sihanouk and the royal aristocracy might have experienced the same fate as the Thai King in 1932: after some wavering among the revolutionaries he was allowed to stay as a constitutional monarch. In Indonesia an early vigorous, though numerically small development of professions took place. As Indonesians were kept out of the higher civil service right to the end of Dutch rule (by 1940 there were only 221 Indonesians among 3,039 higher civil servants), the professions provided the major avenue to social mobility and the financial means for political activism. 'As opportunities for professional training expanded in the last two decades of colonial rule, many more dynamic students tended to seek professional careers where they had more independence from the colonial government' (Yasunaka, 1970:112). When, after independence, the Indonesian bureaucracy mushroomed, this trend was reversed. The percentage of professions in the Indonesian labour force fell from 1.0 per cent in 1930 to 0.7 per cent in 1953. The low development of professionals in Indonesia is confirmed in a recent (1964/5) labour force survey. University educated professionals accounted for only 22 per 100,000 of the employed population. That means that before the war the South-East Asian countries listed above had already a higher proportion of physicians alone in their work force.1 Another strategic group, connecting rural society with the urban or national society is very important. This group consists often of traditional occupations like religious specialists and village headmen as well as modem ones like teachers, agricultural extension officers, police officers, and proctors. Paul Mus claims that in post-colonial Vietnam village leadership was actually the most progressive: The conservatism of the villagers used to be contrasted with the new aspirations of those relatively few urban intellectuals whose attitudes were moulded by contract with French culture. In the present situation, however, it is chiefly the conservative elements that seem to have congregated in the cities, while large areas of the countryside have resorted to armed resistance under leftist leadership (MacAIister and Mus, 1970: 70). Primary school teachers appear to be the crucial elements within this group. Their importance has gone up with their rising numbers both as a basis for socifll mobility into higher positions and as key figures in the struggle for the allegiance of the rural masses. They also seem to playa major role in what might appropriately be called 'cultural revolutions'. A cultural revolution is here defined as a revolt against existing cultural values and a successful reversal of current trends of thought. It is concerned ISee: Survey Sosial Ekonomi National Tahap Kedua (November 1964 - Februari 1965), Angkatan Kerdja Penduduk Indonesia (Ringkasan). Djarkarta: Biro Pusat Statistik. n.y. (ca. 1968), p. 100. 127 primarily with the field of education and language and finds its expression in a change of official language policies, the introduction of an indigenous language as the official language, the creation of a national language, changes in the language of instruction in schools and universities, a cultural revival, usually in the form of a renaissance or alleged renaissance of indigenous arts, values and philosophies. Of course cultural revolutions do not happen in a social vacuum. They are intimately connected with the formation of strategic groups especially those concerned with learning and teaching. The sudden change in numbers of teachers, students, religious specialists of various persuasions, apparently precedes a cultural revolution of this sort. GROUP CONFLICT AND CLASS FORMATION Especially primary school teachers, teaching in the vernaculars, tend to press for a 'national language policy' to ensure access to higher education and eventually higher civil service positions for themselves and their group. The Buddhist renaissance in Ceylon and the re-introduction of Sinhalese as the national language was preceded by a growth of primary school teachers and Ayurvedic physicians. Present developments in Malaysia and the pressure for Malay as the national language in civil service and higher education are also following a decade of rapid expansion of the group of Malay primary school teachers. Here again I stress that I do not claim tnat the growth of this particular strategic group caused the present Malay cultural movement but was a contributing factor or a social structural precondition. After looking at the developments of some of the important strategic groups in South-East Asian societies, I would like to turn to the question of class formation itself. v The rise and the demise of various strategic groups during and after the struggle for independence created highly fragmented societies, in which these groups were competing for the inheritance of the vacated colonial power positions. Remnants of the old aristocracies wielded power and respect in some sections of the populations, but played no role whatsoever in others; professionals and employees, far from forming a 'middle class', had high status and power at times, but were divided by wealth.1 Ethnic loyalties and religious ideologies added to the proliferation of groups and factions. This situation has already changed in some countries or is about IHuntington is, I feel, quite mistaken, when he refers to these strategic groups as 'middle class', and writes: 'The true revolutionary class in most modernising societies is, of course, the middle class' (1968: 289). In most South-East Asian countries these groups were definitely at the top of the social hierarchy. Wertheim is much closer to the truth when he speaks of an 'inte1Iectualand near-intellectual ruling class' in postcolonial Indonesia (1959: 165). 128 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION GROUP CONFLICT AND CLASS FORMATION 129 to lose its importance. A new and more unified class structure seems to emerge. A first step towards class formation was often taken in the form of an economic policy of 'nationalization'. What in fact happened was a merger of the interests of a politically powerful strategic group and an economically strong group of businessman, who in South-East Asia are usually ethnic minorities, Chinese or Indians. Thus the Thai-ification programme of the Thai economy pursued vigorously after 1956 lead in fact to an involvement of the Thai military-bureaucratic elite in Chinese business ventures. The results were striking. Anti-Chinese drives stopped, the relations between government and business improved and both groups prospered. A ban on trade union activities, strict surveillance of popular Buddhist monks and an acquiescent peasantry, until recently not yet (except in the North-east) beset by landlessness and landlordism helped to stabilize the emergent class structure. The theory that social mobility into the higher civil service declined during that period (Evers, 1966; Evers and Silcock, 1967) leading to a fairly closed class structure, Was confirmed by a recent Japanese Survey on Social Stratification in Bangkok. 'Intra-generational mobility in Bangkok cannot be called high from whatever angle it is investigated .... Accordingly Bangkok is a closed society', conclude the researchers in their 1970 report (Tominaga et al., 1970:3). Similar alliances enhancing class formation could be found in Malaya. Already before independence, an attempt was made to pool the resources of the Malay political elite (and those remnants of the aristocracy that remain within it) with Chinese business interests.l The experiment was not so much endangered in 1969 by factional strife within this alliance but by racial· tension and strife within the lower class whose aspirations for social mobility into higher positions were fanned but not fulfilled. In Burma and in Indonesia the alliance between military-bureaucratic groups and non-indigenous business interest did not materialize. The Burmanization policy lead to a more or less forceful removal of Indians and Chinese with economically disastrous results.2 Anti-Chinese politics in Indonesia led to a decline of Chinese small business though some reversal ofthis policy can be sensed at the moment. The alliance which helps to stabilize the military-bureaucratic groups in Indonesia, as well as in Thailand and South Vietnam is now contracted with foreigners, which make the Chinese business community less important. Especially in South Vietnam, the massive American intervention has backed one of the strategic groups, 1In the economic field the co-operation is most aptly demonstrated in the logging business, where members of the Malay aristocratic or bureaucratic elites provide licenses and Chinese businessmen capital and know-how. The 1969 race riots between Malays and Chinese were obviously a lower class phenomenon. 'The politics of Burmanization are described by Holmes, 1967. Violence against Chinese erupted again in 1967. Whether the new U Nu led UNLF will indirectly cause an alliance of Ne Win's military group and Chinese or foreign business groups remains to be seen. military officers, to such an extent that this group has seen no necessity to seek alliances among other strategic groups like the Buddhist clergy, professionals or students. In Thailand American military aid had become very important. Access to thIS source of support has probably strengthened the power of the military ruling class to such an extent that Thailand remained without the usual coup d'etat for so long. On the whole international aid, especially American military aid, has contributed largely to the establishment and consolidation of a strong upper class which is able to ensure law and order and suppress rebellions.l The most spectacular process of class formation has been going on in Indonesia for some time. Here the military themselves have branched out and filled the most important positions in the higher civil service and the economy, legitimized by the ideology of the 'civil mission of the armed forces' (Gavi, 1968). The possible formation of a unified lower class, attempted by the PKI, was successfully inhibited by religious strategic groups and the army. Professionals and intellectuals are co-opted and neutralized as technocrats, are tightly controlled as golongan karya (functional groups of Indonesian parliaments), or form part of a widespread patronage system. Political parties, still patterned on the old aliran system, are so far not seen as a threat to the power of the ruling military elite. The resumption of foreign aid and the influx of foreign capital has helped considerably in the formatioIJ. of a unified upper class. Foreign companies have provided executive positions and are frequently blamed for providing substantial sums as bribes to higher government officials. As foreign companies operate on a profit basis, these sums are used to achieve a reduction of taxes and duties or are charged to the Indonesian government through higher fees and prices. Inflated rents for housing foreigners provide an additional source of income for the new upper class. Foreign investors and aid agencies serve thus as a channel for the redistribution of the Indonesian GNP into the upper class. As most of the new ventures are in the extraction industries, like oil, mining or logging, their direct effect on the creation of new occupations is probably small. Though no recent empirical studies on social stratification in Djakarta have come to my attention, a mere observation of Djakarta life today gives an indication of present trends. Ecologically, upper class and lower class districts are 1Among other factors described below substantial US-AID investment guarantees covering the risk of 'expropriation, war, revolution, insurrection' (Jan. 1967, Indonesia) create a definite interest on the part of the US government in maintaining a sta~le, capitalist-inclined, friendly government, in power. Several American political scien~sts have actively supported this policy in their works. To cite but one example: Chalmers A. Johnson, Revolutionary Change (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966, pp. 119-20) argues for the need to measure 'disequilibrated conditions' which promote revolutions. 'PracticaI1y speaking, an index of disequilibrium would provide a means of warning a legitimate elite of the possibility of revolution, thereby alerting it to the need for both policies of social change and military counter-insurgency preparations.' 130 SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND MODERNIZATION clearly separated. The mansions, luxury cars and lavish functions of the new upper class provide a vivid contrast to the slum areas of recent migrants and the crowded housing areas of minor government officials. Though the living standard of some middle income groups seems to be rising, the cultural, social and economic distance to the new upper class is definitely increasing. Judging from samples of marriage patterns and careers of upper class children, self-recruitment and closure seems to be the trend. The re-traditionalization of Javanese rural and small town population, mentioned before, is thus contrasted by an increasingly Western life-style of the upper class. But these are only speculations on recent developments which should be checked by survey data. Also elsewhere in South-East Asia the international dimensions of class formation are becoming more and more apparent. A host of foreign experts, business partners, embassy personnel and military advisers have become an integral part of the new upper class. They intermingle freely with the indigenous elite and tend to live in the same residential areas of the metropolitan cities. The colonial 'European city' and 'native quarter' is frequently replaced by culturally and socially equally differentiated upper and lower class districts. GROUP CONFLICT AND CLASS FORMATION 131 often by ethnic, cultural or religious identities. After classes are consolidated by alliances as described above, the direction of conflict tends to shift: conflict between groups declines and conflict between the new upper class and the peasant or urban masses tends to arise. Instead of the ousting of rival factions we will have insurgency instead of coup d'etat revolutions. How far reality will approximate or has already approximated to this type of social and political development remains to be seen from further research. VI If we abstract even further from the extremely rich tapestry of South-East Asian social structures and events the analysis warrants, I think, some ideal typical conclusions. The first is, in a way, a paradox. 'Modernization' has produced a trend towards the development of a new, rigid class structure. By creating and consolidating a new upper class, the modernization process is, however, eventually arrested or at least retarded. 'Modernization' and the material fruits of modernization are increasingly concentrated within the new upper class. Perhaps South-East Asian societies tend to develop features similar to a number of Latin American countries. Economic development is concentrated in the large urban centres,! foreign political and economic influence is strong, and the overall development low. Modernization has produced its own barriers. The second conclusion is that the period after independence tended to be characterized by intense conflict between groups and factions. Many of these groups shared ruling class features: they had access to power and wealth and they dominated large-scale organizations (like parties, bureaucracies, armies or business companies). But they were fragmented, 11 have discussed this process in a short paper read at the International Conference on Southeast Asian Studies in Kuala Lumpur, 23-26 February 1972: 'Urban Involution: The Social Structure of Southeast Asian Towns', Working Papers, No.2, Dept. of Sociology, University of Singapore, Singapore, 1972.